TERMiNATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: AN ADDITIONAL
SENTENCE FOR INCARCERATED PARENTS

INTRODUCTION

Termination of parental rights has severe ramifications in that it
permanently severs the parent-child relationship, rendering the parent legally unable to participate in the child's life.' For incarcerated
parents, termination of parental rights poses particular problems
and considerations. Each state handles termination for imprisoned
parents differently, ranging from states that allow termination based
on incarceration for a specified period of time to states that conduct
a full-scale critique of the parent-child relationship with incarceration as only one consideration. Based on the available psychological
data5 and constitutional concerns, 6 the only acceptable approach to
termination of parental rights for incarcerated parents is one that
looks beyond the parent's status as incarcerated and analyzes the
parent-child relationship as a whole. Less thorough approaches may
legitimately conserve time and resources, but these savings fail to
outweigh the damage caused by erroneous termination or the countervailing risk of leaving a child in a harmful relationship. 7
I See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-6-4 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that termination of parental rights ends all rights and obligations between the natural parent
and child, including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or support); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3-50 (West 1993) (declaring that adoption ends all fights and responsibilities between the natural parent and the child).
2 SeelnreCaldwell, 571 N.W.2d 218, 219 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997) (noting the difficulty in applying the State's termination statute to incarcerated parents since it is
difficult to analyze contact and support when the parent is incarcerated); In re L.V.,
482 N.W.2d 250, 258-59 (Neb. 1992) (discussing the problem of the presence of an

incarcerated parent at hearings with respect to transportation, delay, and inconvenience).
3

See, e.g., CoLo. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997)

(permitting termination of parental rights if the State is to incarcerate the parent
for more than six years from the date the child was adjudicated dependent or neglected).
4 See, e.g., In re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 631 A.2d 928
(1993).
5See infa

Part I-B and accompanying notes.

6 See infra Part I-A and accompanying notes.
7

See In re D.P., 465 N.W.2d 313, 315-16 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). The court ter-
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In the context of imprisoned parents, termination proceedings
are usually initiated in one of three ways: (1) by the state,8 (2) by the
non-incarcerated natural parent who has remarried and would like
his or her new spouse to adopt the child,9 or (3) by a family member
or foster family with whom the child lives during the parent's incarceration.'0 For incarcerated and non-incarcerated parents alike,
every state has a statute authorizing involuntary termination of parental rights." Termination generally requires clear and convincing
evidence of parental unfitness, severe neglect, or abandonment to be
presented at a full hearing. 2 Some states terminate incarcerated
parents' rights simply because they will be incarcerated for a specified period of time or have committed certain types of crimes. 4 In
these states, the burden to demonstrate unfitness or abandonment is
greatly diminished or nonexistent because criminal status essentially
provides the basis for termination." Other states look to efforts
minated parental rights after focusing largely on the fact of incarceration and overlooked the strong emotional relationship shared by the mother and children and
the distress that would result from termination. See id.; see also E.W.R. v. W.TJ., 702
So. 2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). The court focused on the efforts of the
father to maintain contact with and to provide support for his child and decided not
to terminate parental rights. See id. Although the court received information that
continuing the relationship could prove harmful, the child was left in a relationship
with a father who would be in prison for sexual battery until the child was 17. See id.
8 See, e.g., D.P., 465 N.W.2d at 314 (noting that
the state instituted the proceedings for termination of parental rights).
9 See, e.g., E.WR, 702 So. 2d at 1343-44 (evidencing an attempt by a
biological
mother's new husband to adopt the mother's child).
10 See, e.g., In re M.F., 660 So. 2d 952, 953 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (setting forth the
facts of the case as a petition by a grandmother for adoption of the child); In re
Christina P., 220 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining the factual
situation as a petition by a foster family to terminate the parental rights of an incarcerated father, thereby freeing the child for adoption).
1 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 625.050 to § 625.090 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1996); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE
ANN., art. 1015 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); ME. REv. STAT ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (West
1992 & Supp. 1997).
1
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof prior to termination); In re L.A.S., 134
NJ. 127, 133-35, 631 A.2d 928, 931-32 (1993) (noting that unfitness, abandonment,
or neglect will justify termination).
13 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997)
(allowing
termination of parental rights if the length of a parent's incarceration extends for
more than six years from the date the child was adjudicated dependent or neglected).
14 See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-3-4 (West Supp. 1997) (setting forth that convictions for certain types of crimes including murder, rape, or involuntary manslaughter may be grounds for termination of parental rights).
15 See infra Part II-A and accompanying notes.
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made by the parent during incarceration to maintain contact with
the child or the incarcerated parent's ability to provide for the
child.' 6 Failure to make these efforts or to provide for the child will
allow for termination based on neglect or abandonment. 7 Some
states engage in a full-scale analysis of the parent-child relationship
by considering the nature of the relationship before and after incarceration and the effects of parental incarceration on the child in order to determine if the statutory criteria for termination have been
met."
In light of the psychological data 9 and due process concerns, 2
the most beneficial approach is one that analyzes the parent-child
relationship as a whole. Specifically, all states should provide a full
adversarial hearing at which the parent is present and represented by
counsel. 2' At the hearing, the court should consider several factors
in assessing whether to terminate parental rights. Specifically, the
court should examine the parent-child relationship before and after
incarceration as well as the psychological impact of the parent's incarceration on the child. 2 The court should also consider the parent's ability to fulfill his or her responsibilities as a parent during incarceration. 3 While it is true that the fact of incarceration is an
important factor to consider in termination proceedings, it should
not be dispositive. 2' States that terminate parental rights based on
incarceration status may permanently sever the important, positive

16 See infra Part II-C and accompanying
notes.

17 See infta Part 11-C and accompanying notes.
See infra Part II-D and accompanying notes.
1: See infra Part II-D and accompanying notes.
See infra Part I-B and accompanying notes.

20

See infra Part I-A and accompanying notes.

21 See Philip M. Genty, ProceduralDue Process Rights of IncarceratedParents in Termi-

nation of ParentalRights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757, 773-81
(1991-92) (emphasizing the importance of a parent's presence and representation
at termination hearings).
See In re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 143, 631 A.2d 928, 936 (1993) (discussing
the

psychological issues and due process concerns raised in termination proceedings
for incarcerated parents and citing these factors as considerations in assessing termination for incarcerated parents).
23

See id.

See id. (arguing that termination for incarcerated parents cannot be decided
"without a full and conscientious consideration of all relevant facts and circum24

stances"); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. §211.447(3)(6)

(West 1996 & Supp. 1998)

("Incarceration in and of itself shall not be a grounds for termination of parental
rights."); In re D.S.G., 947 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that
incarceration alone does not establish abandonment sufficient to support termina-

tion of parental rights).
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relationship that a parent and child share.
This decision would
seem shortsighted in cases in which the parent will be incarcerated
for a relatively short period of time or wherein the crime committed
is not indicative of the prisoner's parenting skills." Conversely, failure to undertake a full analysis of the parent-child relationship may
leave a child in a damaging, harmful relationship with a parent
merely because the parent maintained minimal contacts 2' or because
the parent did not commit the "right" kind of crime to allow for
termination 8
States have a legitimate interest in conserving time and administrative resources, which would be achieved by using less-thanthorough approaches for termination.2 Termination based on less
than a comprehensive hearing will conserve time and resources because decisions can be made quickly and testimony by experts regarding the psychological impact of incarceration on children may
not be required.3° Further, if the parent-child relationship is not
25

See Note, On Prisonersand Parenting: Preserving the Tie That Binds, 87 YALE L.J.

1408, 1414 (1978) [hereinafter On Prisonersand Parenting] (maintaining that separating the child from a parent once the parent-child bond has been formed can seriously disrupt the emotional development of the child).
26 See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West
Supp. 1997) (stating that incarceration of at least six years shows unfitness and permits termination); IowA
CODE ANN. § 232.116 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (permitting termination when the
parent will be incarcerated for more than five years from the date of the termination hearing and the child is in state care); MD.CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (1991
& Supp. 1997) (allowing termination of parental rights for children in state care for
more than a year, thereby forcing any incarcerated parent who cannot arrange for
private care to face termination of parental rights after one year).
See, e.g., E.W.R. v. W.T.J., 702 So. 2d 1343, 1343-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
A Florida court decided not to terminate a natural father's rights when the father
would be in jail until the child was 17, although the court was presented with evidence that the child's relationship with the father was harmful. See id. The court
considered only efforts to contact and support the child and decided not to terminate the father's rights. See id. It is ironic to note that the father actually provided
very little contact or support, but, because he was incarcerated, the court determined that he had made enough of an effort to avoid termination. See id. at 1345.
The court, focusing solely on contact and support, left the child in the harmful relationship. See id.
28 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) (permitting
terminaion if the parent is convicted of a felony where the felony "is of such nature as
to prove the unfitness of such parent to have future custody and control of the
child"); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-3-4 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing termination if the
parent has been convicted of certain types of crimes including murder or rape or
involuntary manslaughter).
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) ("The establishment of
prompt, efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication.").
so See infra Part II-A.
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terminated, the state must address the issues of visitation in prison
and reunification of the family upon release.-' Lesser approaches
may be fiscally attractive, but the money saved does not justify the
harm of wrongful termination of parental rights or the potential risk
of leaving a child in a harmful relationship. 2
Part I of this Note will discuss the available psychological data
related to a parent's incarceration and the effect of parental incarceration on children. In addition, Part I will discuss the constitutional concerns that are implicated when parental rights are terminated. Part II will look at various ways in which states approach
termination of parental rights for incarcerated parents. Part II will
also suggest that the most appropriate approach is one that looks beyond the state of incarceration, the nature of the parent's crime, or
the parent's minimal contacts and instead engages in a full-scale
analysis of the parent-child relationship when considering whether
to terminate parental rights of incarcerated parents.
I.
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND DUE PROCESS CONCERNS REGARDING
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR INCARCERATED PARENTS

Whenever parental rights are terminated, it is important to address due process concerns"" and to discuss the potential psychological impact of that termination on the child.34 These issues become
more convoluted in the context of prisoners and their children."
31 See On Prisonersand Parenting,supra note 25, at 1422-27 (discussing the special
efforts that states must make to maintain a healthy relationship between an incarcerated parent and the child if the relationship is not terminated, as well as the
problems that arise upon the parent's release).
s2 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57. As the Court explained:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the
determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly
risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent
and child. It therefore cannot stand.
Id.

See id. at 656-58 (addressing the due process concerns in termination cases).
See In re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 138-41, 631 A.2d 928, 933-35 (1993)
(emphasizing the importance of addressing psychological issues regarding termination for incarcerated parents).
35 See William H. Sack, Children of Imprisoned Parents, 40 PSYcHIATRY 163, 163
(1977). The author contends that separation caused by imprisonment raises special
problems and concerns for the parent-child relationship. See id. For example, the
author notes that children of incarcerated fathers may show an increase in aggressive and anti-social behavior. See id. at 163, 169. Arguably, termination of rights for
incarcerated parents will be more difficult in light of the problems caused by separation due to imprisonment. Additional problematic issues that arise in assessing
33
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The psychological ramifications of parental imprisonment and termination of parental rights on a child are very complex, and the legal community must understand how these considerations will affect
the child when contemplating termination.36 Due process concerns
are present in any termination case, but these issues are complicated
by the fact of a parent's incarceration if a state is to provide a meaningful hearing and avoid termination based on a mere presumption.
A.

Due Process Concerns

It is well established that the parent-child relationship is entitled
to constitutional protection. Therefore, any termination proceeding raises numerous constitutional concerns, the most essential of
9 and Santosky v.
which involve due process rights. 8 Stanley v. Illinois"
Kramer were two cases in which the United State Supreme Court
addressed these concerns and struck down state procedures for termination of parental rights as violative of due process.
Stanley considered the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that
allowed the State to terminate automatically the parental rights of
unwed fathers without a particularized hearing or a determination of
parental unfitness.
Specifically, upon the death of the natural
mother, the children of unwed fathers became wards of the State,
thereby invalidating a father's parental rights. 2 The State maintained that unwed fathers were unqualified to raise their illegitimate
termination for incarcerated parents include reunification upon release from
prison, visitation while the parent is in prison, temporary child care while the parent is in prison, the age of the child, and the length of the parent's incarceration.
See On Prisonersand Parenting,supranote 25, at 1416-29.

See infra Part I-B and accompanying notes.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (declaring that parents
have a fundamental interest in "the religious future and education of their children"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)) ('ITihe custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923) (stating that parents have a fundamental interest in controlling the
education of their children).
See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-52 (acknowledging that due process and equal protection are implicated in termination proceedings).
39 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
40 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
41 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646-47. Joan and Peter Stanley lived together
intermittently for 18 years and produced three children, but never married. See id. at 646.
UponJoan's death, Peter lost custody of the children pursuant to an Illinois statute.
See id. The statute declared that children born out of wedlock became wards of the
state upon the death of the mother. See id.
37

42

See id.
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children. 43 The State contended that unwed fathers demonstrated
their unfitness as parents by virtue of their marital status alone,
which warranted an automatic termination of parental rights.4 By
contrast, unwed mothers or divorced parents lost their children only
of parental unafter a court made an individualized determination
4
fitness that rose to the level of neglect.

The Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois statute and required
the State to conduct a hearing and make a particularized finding of
unfitness or some other statutory basis before allowing termination.4
In so holding, the Court opined that the Due Process Clause 47 and
the Equal Protection Clause" mandate a thorough procedure to ensure that the rights of the parent and the child are protected. 49 The
Court expressed its disapproval of presumptions, declaring them tolerable only when reasonable and necessary to promote a legitimate
governmental interest.' It is important to note that the Court in
See
See
45 See
46 See
47 See
43

id. at 653.
id. at 650.
id.
id. at 657-58.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause states that "[nlo State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
... Id. The Due Process Clause clearly applies when the state interferes with the
parent-child relationship. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1922). Thus, the Court mandated individualized
procedures to protect against inappropriate interference in the parent-child relationship. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-58.
48 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection
Clause provides that "no
State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id. The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted as forbidding states
from discriminating against citizens based on their status. See Glona v. American
Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968). The Stanley Court felt the Illinois legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated against Stanley
based on his status as an unwed father without a particularized determination of
unfitness. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-58.
49 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-58. The Illinois statute violated the Due
Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause because it treated individuals differently
based on their status with respect to a fundamental right. See id. at 658. Specifically, unwed fathers automatically lost their children due to their status rather than
based on a specific finding of unfitness. See id.
50 See id. at 655-57. The Court discussed Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 95-97
(1965), in which the Court struck down a Texas statute that forbade servicemen stationed in Texas from voting in local elections. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 655-57. Although the CarringtonCourt agreed that Texas had a legitimate interest in limiting
the voting pool to bona fide residents who intended to remain in the State, the
Court did not approve of the blanket presumption that servicemen would not remain in the State and thus could be denied their fundamental right to vote. See
Carrington,380 U.S. at 95. Rather, the Court required the State to make individualized determinations regarding each serviceman's intent to remain in the State. See
44
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Stanley mentioned that many unwed fathers may in fact be unfit and
may, therefore, deserve to have their rights terminated.5 ' Despite the
Court's recognition of this fact, the majority took issue with the
State's procedure of automatic termination based on a presumption
without a particularized showing of unfitness.2 This point is vital to
the discussion of incarcerated parents. Termination may be the appropriate remedy for many incarcerated parents, but termination
without a meaningful hearing - which includes a detailed analysis
of the parent-child relationship and some individualized determination of unfitness, abuse, or neglect - is constitutionally unacceptable.5"
The Court, in Santosky, discussed the appropriate
burden of
S
54
proof for involuntary termination proceedings.
The Court reinforced the importance of the parent-child relationship and the fundamental interest that parents have in the "care, custody, and management" of their children.55 In light of these interests, the Court
noted that termination proceedings, and other procedures interfering with the parent-child relationship, must comply with the Due
Process Clause.56 The Court explained that due process requires at
least clear and convincing evidence 57 of statutory criteria such as unfitness or abandonment before termination will be permitted. 58 In
id.

51 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654.
52 See id. at 654-58.
63 See Genty, supra note 21, at 822. The author argues
that termination of parental rights is unconstitutional where there is no individualized determination of unfitness or termination hearing at which the parent is present or represented by
counsel. See id. at 771.
SeeSantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1982).
56 See id. at 753.
56 See id. at 753-54.
57 See id. at 747-48. The Court found, "Before a State may sever completely
and
irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the
State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence." Id. The
Court indicated that states would be responsible for defining this standard of proof
or adopting and defining a higher standard of proof. See id. at 769-70.
.5
See id. The Court balanced three factors to arrive at the clear and convincing
evidence standard: "the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental
interest supporting use of the challenged procedure." Id. at 754. The Court announced that the private interest was strong and included parents' interests in raising their children. See id. at 758-61. The government's interests, the Court explained, included a desire to protect children and the need to conserve costs and
resources. See id. at 766. The Court further posited that under the preponderance
of the evidence standard, the risk of error was split equally between the parent and
the State. See id. at 768. The Court noted that this risk was unacceptable in light of
the important private interest at stake. See id. at 768-69. Accordingly, the Court
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light of that requirement, the Court struck down New York's preponderance of the evidence standard as violative of the Due Process
Clause.59
Santosky established an increased burden that the government
must meet in proceedings for termination of parental rights. 60 The
opinion also strongly advocated the rights of parents to their children and the strength of the parent-child relationship."' The Court
clearly stated that parents do not lose their fundamental interest in
their children "simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State." 2 Thus, incarceration on its own should not negate a parent's interests in the
child, and factors such as the parent-child relationship and the impact of a parent's incarceration on the child should be considered."
After Santosky and Stanley, involuntary termination requires the
movant to produce at a hearing clear and convincing evidence of unfitness or some other statutory criteria permitting termination in the
respective state. States now technically comply with this mandate by
providing a hearing prior to termination and requiring at least clear
and convincing evidence of unfitness, abandonment, or neglect before a parent's rights may be terminated. 4 In many states, however,
this process adheres only to the letter and not to the true spirit of
Santosky and Stanley."' Some states, either statutorily or judicially, determine unfitness, abandonment, or neglect based on the fact of incarceration for a specified time period or incarceration resulting
from the commission of certain crimes, thus constituting a sufficient
basis for termination." Some states do not require or permit the
parent to be• present
at the termination hearing, and counsel is often
67
not provided. If termination of parental rights continues to rest on
struck down the preponderance standard and required clear and convincing evidence as the requisite minimum burden in termination proceedings. See id.
59 See id.
at 768-69.
60 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768-69.
61 See id. at 758-61.
62 Id. at 753.
63
See, e.g., Genty, supra note 21, at 805-25 (analyzing state statutes that permit

termination based on incarceration and pointing to the need to consider other factors).
See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.34.190 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998)
(requiring a hearing and clear and convincing evidence of specific statutory criteria
prior to termination); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.41.4 (Anderson 1994 & Supp.
rA

1997) (permitting termination if there exists clear and convincing evidence of certain statutory criteria including abandonment).
See infra Parts II-A to II-C and accompanying notes.
66 See infra Parts 11-A to I-B and accompanying notes.
67 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32, (1980)
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the nature of the crime or the length of incarceration, then unfitness
is essentially presumed before the hearing, thereby negating the individualized determination required by Stanley. It is necessary that a
procedure respect the interests of a parent in his or her child and
the constitutional protection owed to the parent-child relationship."
States must require that a hearing, at which the parent is present and
represented by counsel, be structured to enable the judge to engage
69
of whether termination is proper. Unfortuin a detailed analysis
nately, many states have failed to meet this requirement.
B. PsychologicalData
The psychological effects of parental incarceration on children
vary greatly from child to child. Parental incarceration can have a
pronounced negative effect on a child and may temporarily or permanently affect the child's development and future relationships.
Conversely, many children can have healthy and productive relationships with an incarcerated parent, and, in fact, it is the termination
of this relationship that can have serious and damaging effects. 7' Because the effects of incarceration are so varied, individualized hearings and termination procedures become imperative and presump-

(noting that a right to counsel does not exist for every termination proceeding); In
re C.G., 885 P.2d 355, 357 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that incarcerated parents
do not have a constitutional right to be present at termination hearings); In re L.V.,
482 N.W.2d 250, 258 (Neb. 1992) (finding no due process violation when a court
terminated the parental rights of an inmate who was not present at the hearing).
68 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972)
(recognizing that
"procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier" than procedures requiring
individualized determinations, but mandating that parents should not be robbed of
their rights, among which is a meaningful hearing prior to termination of custody).
69 See Genty, supra note 21, at 771 (arguing that in deciding termination for the
children of incarcerated parents "[a] court must conduct a full adversarial hearing
in which the parent is physically present and represented by counsel so that it is
able to develop a complete factual basis on which to assess accurately the complex
issues before it.")
70 See On Prisoners and Parenting,supra note 25, at 1411-22. The author
contends
that the effects of parental incarceration on a child can vary depending on individual factors including: the age of the child when the parent is incarcerated; whether
the child will be placed with a relative, in a foster home, or in an institution; and
the nature of the parent-child relationship prior to incarceration. See id.
71 See id. at 1413-16 (discussing the negative effects on a child that
can result
from separation caused by the parent's incarceration, including development of a
psychopathic personality, loss of verbal skills, academic difficulties, and delinquent
behavior).
72 See id. at 1416 ("The impact of a temporary separation [due to incarceration]
can be lessened by measures that encourage the child to maintain the relationship
with the parent.").
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tive approaches are inadequate." Specifically, it is important to avoid
the termination of a potentially positive relationship simply because
the parent has committed a crime. The temporary loss of the parent
during imprisonment
extremely
harmful without the added
distess
f pemanet can be .
74
distress of permanent separation.
Alternatively, it is important to
avoid leaving a child in a damaging relationship with an incarcerated
parent simply because the conduct or crime of the parent does not
trigger the presumption of unfitness.75 In light of the inconsistent
effects of parental incarceration on a child, a thorough analysis,
which would consider the impact of a parent's incarceration on the
child, is warranted
to make the proper determination in a termina• 76
tion proceeding.
Data indicate that an incarcerated parent can have a beneficial
relationship with his or her child.77 Despite incarceration, healthy
73 See Fusco v. Fusco, 186 N.J. Super. 321, 326-27, 452 A.2d 681,
684-85 (App.

Div. 1982) (requiring an individualized hearing to determine visitation for an incarcerated parent due to the potentially varied psychological effects of a parent's
incarceration on children).
74 See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate ParentalRights?,
35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 46167 (1983) (discussing several studies that emphasize the importance of maintaining
contacts between natural parents and children when the children are placed in foster care); see also Frail v. Frail, 370 N.E.2d 303, 304-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding
that visitation with the incarcerated mother could be beneficial and rewarding for
the child and noting that forbidding visitation could have an overall harmful effect).
75 See E.W.R. v. W.T.J., 702 So. 2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997)
(receiving evidence that continuing the parent-child relationship could be dangerous to the child in the future, yet not terminating parental rights because the father's behavior did not trigger the statute's definition of abandonment).
76 See On Prisonersand Parenting,supra note 25, at 1418-19 (noting that
in dealing
with children of imprisoned parents it is important to consider the psychological
effects of incarceration because "the psychological and emotional needs of a child
whose parent is imprisoned are as important in assuring the child's normal development as are education or physical health and safety") (citations omitted); see also
In re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139, 631 A.2d 928, 934 (1993) (finding that the potential
effects of incarceration on a child's psychological well-being are "extremely fact sensitive" and that "[tihe parent's incarceration must be assessed in terms of whether
the attempts to maintain a parent-child relationship will be harmful to the child").
77 See, e.g., On Prisonersand Parenting,supra note 25, at
1416-17 ("[I1n most cases
of parental incarceration the child's welfare will best be served by maintaining the
parent-child bond," which is generally done through visitation); see also Eva Lee
Homer, Inmate-Family Ties: Desirable But Difficult, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1979, at 4748 (finding that interaction between inmates and their children can have positive
effects such as lower recidivism, more successful parole for parents, and stronger
family ties); Sack, supra note 35, at 168 (1977) (citing one case study in which visitation with an incarcerated father had calming, positive effects and helped to eliminate negative behavior in which the children had engaged since the father's incarceration).
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interaction between parent and child is possible and the imprisoned
parent can, in some cases, fulfill the child's psychological and emotional needs.' 8 When the parent and child are separated, contact can
mitigate the distress caused by separation." Termination, which
would erase this contact, can be very damaging.8° In these cases, contact should be encouraged and termination should be discouraged,
but only a full-scale analysis will reveal the benefits or detriments of
maintaining the parent-child relationship."' The length of incarceration and the possibility of frequent contact are important considerations in determining if a healthy relationship is possible or if termination is appropriate. 2 States that look only to the underlying crime
that resulted in incarceration, or to the minimal efforts made by incarcerated parents to maintain contact, will not address these con85
cerns.
Negative effects on a child resulting from the detention of a
parent can include anger, aggressive behavior, decline in school performance, and an increased risk of the child's own incarceration in
the future. 4 These negative effects may spring from the lack of consistent parental interaction.8 5 For infants, separation from the parent
can be particularly harmful because babies form a critical bond with
7a See Sack, supra note 35, at 168; see also In re Daniel C., 480 A.2d 766,
769 (Me.
1984) (noting that incarcerated parents and children can form the appropriate
parent-child relationship); On Prisoners and Parenting, supra note 25, at 1425-26

(arguing that an incarcerated parent and child can have a positive relationship and
suggesting ways to facilitate the relationship); cf Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96
(1987) (holding that the positive emotional aspects of marriage can exist despite
the incarceration of one spouse).
79 See Garrison, supra note 74, at 461-67 (discussing several studies that emphasize the importance of continued contact between parents and children).
so See In re C.A.W., 683 A.2d 911, 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (noting that termination of parental rights can be traumatic for a child and that the emotional bond between the parent and child must be considered prior to termination).
81 See, e.g., In re Caldwell, 571 N.W.2d 218, 219-21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). The
court discussed section 710.51(6) of the Michigan Compiled Laws and section
27.3178(555.51) (6) of the Michigan Statutes Annotated, which permit termination
based on visitation and support. See id. at 219-20. Accordingly, the appellate court
stated that termination may be appropriate without a full-scale analysis that would
consider evidence of the child's best interests. See id. at 220.
See On Prisonersand Parenting,supra note 25, at 1411-17 (listing length of incarceration, age of the child, and visitation as important factors in evaluating the
effect of parental incarceration as those factors relate to forming a bond that will
hel? avoid later psychotic behavior).
See Caldwell 571 N.W.2d at 220.
SeeJustin Brooks and Kimberly Bahna, "It'sa Family Affair" - The Incarceration
of the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 271, 281

(1994).
85

See On Prisoners and Parenting,supra note 25, at 1411-14.
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parents in the first six to twenty-four months of life." Failure to form
this bond can result in lifelong distress and socialization problems."'
If a parent is incarcerated, the bond is not formed, and it generally
cannot be formed with a foster family because the foster care system
discourages caregivers from forming attachments to their foster children.8 Shifting a child from one foster family to another exacerbates this effect and can increase the possibility of a child developing
a psychopathic personality. 9 For very young children of incarcerated
parents, therefore, termination may be the appropriate alternative so
that the child may be adopted and can then form this bond with the
adoptive parent. 0 States failing to engage in a full-scale analysis of
the parent-child relationship that considers the age of the child do
not address this concern. Thus, they ignore very important psychological and developmental considerations.
For older children, visits to prison may be disturbing and can
result in aggressive, antisocial behavior. 9' Older children who are
shifted from caregiver to caregiver may lack educational influence,
which can lead to delinquent or criminal behavior. 92 In such cases,
86 See id. at 1413. This critical bond is usually formed with
the natural parent
but can be formed with a caregiver, such as an adoptive parent, who acts as the
natural parent. See id. at 1414-15.
87 See id. at 1413-14; see also In re F.N.M., 951 S.W.2d 702,
705, 707 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997) and In re Nadene, 701 A.2d 1021, 1022 (R.I. 1997) (both discussing the bond
between a parent and child in deciding termination, thus underscoring the importance of the bond in the parent-child relationship).

See On Prisonersand Parenting,supra note 25, at 1420. The author
contends:

[Floster care is also unlikely to provide the needed parental figure
and the continuity of care the children require. Although foster care
is intended to replicate the conditions of normal family life, this ideal
is seldom realized in practice ....

[Blecause foster parents know that

a child has been placed with them only temporarily, they may be unwilling to invest in an emotional relationship with the child in their
care. Indeed, foster parents are often warned not to become too attached to the child so that their eventual separation will not be too
painful for the child, and child welfare agencies often remove a child
from a foster home if it is found that a foster parent has become too
attached to the child.
Id. 89See
(citations omitted).
id. at 1414-15.
90 See id. at 1417-18 (suggesting that termination
may be the best solution where
there is to be a long incarceration, frequent contact is not possible, or the parent
has harmed the child).
91 See Sack, supra note 35, at 169 (discussing one case study
in which the effects
of parental incarceration included aggressive behavior toward siblings and peers).
92 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREsTS OF THE CHILD
34

(1973) (maintaining that for older children, the disruption of the psychological relationship with the parent that is caused by the parent's incarceration and the pos-
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termination of the parent-child relationship may be appropriate to
break this criminal cycle. If the parent-child relationship suffered
prior to incarceration, then prison will obviously not improve matters. 93 Further, the reunion upon the parent's release can be difficult
and potentially harmful."' The parent will generally have difficulty
adjusting to the outside world, and the child may have trouble readjusting to the relationship with a parent whom he may have seen
only sporadically for several years. 95 Thus, for older children, termination may be appropriate, but states that fail to engage in a detailed
analysis of the parent-child relationship will never address these concerns and may, therefore, make an improper decision as to the future of the parent-child relationship.
While a parent's incarceration can have serious, damaging effects on a child, it is also possible for children to maintain a healthy,
positive relationship with an incarcerated parent. In such cases,
termination of parental rights may result in harm to the child. Because the effects of a parent's incarceration on the child are so varied, a full-scale analysis of the parent-child relationship, which makes
individualized determinations of the impact of a parent's incarceration on the child, would best serve both parents and children.
II.

STATE APPROACHES TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR
INCARCERATED PARENTS

State treatment of termination of parental rights for incarcerated parents varies, with states generally falling into one of four categories. One approach terminates the parent-child relationship because a parent will be incarcerated for a specified time period. 96
Other states look at the nature of the crime committed and the facts
surrounding the crime. These states disregard the possibility that a
positive parent-child relationship may exist with an incarcerated parent and seem to ignore due process concerns by terminating parental rights based on a presumption rather than a meaningful, indisibility of multiple placement can lead the child to engage in delinquent behavior).
93 See C.S. Lanier, Jr., Dimensions of Father-Child Interaction in a New
York State
Prison Population, 16J. OFFENDER REHAB. 27, 36 (1991).
94 See On Prisonersand Parenting,supra
note 25, at 1417.
95 See id.

See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997)
(permitting termination of parental rights if the parent will be incarcerated for
more than six years from the date the child was adjudicated dependent or neglected).
97 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-3-4 (West Supp. 1997) (setting forth that a
96

conviction for certain crimes, including murder, involuntary manslaughter, or rape,
can be grounds for termination of parental rights).
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vidualized determination of parental fitness.98 Other states look to
the parent's incarceration and the minimal efforts made by the parent to maintain contact or the parent's ability to provide for the
child. 99 This approach may deprive a parent of parental rights because he or she is unable to contribute monetary support to the
child or to provide a home for the child at the time." Conversely,
such an approach may leave a child in a damaging relationship with
an incarcerated parent because the parent has made minimal efforts
or contributions sufficient to meet the statutory criteria although the
parent and child will be separated for years.'0 ' The remaining states
engage in a full-scale analysis of the parent-child relationship and
consider all relevant circumstances. 0 2 These states acknowledge the
gravity of termination of parental rights, the varied psychological effects of parental incarceration on the child, and the due process
concerns raised by termination. 10 Less detailed approaches may save
time and resources. However, a comprehensive, fair determination
that considers all aspects of the parent-child relationship best serves
the interests of parent and child.

98 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972)
(emphasizing the importance of hearings and meaningful evaluations in termination proceedings).
:" See infra Part II-C and accompanying notes.
00 See infra Part II-C and accompanying notes.
01 See In re C.A.W., 683 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996) (citing In re M.J.H.,
501 A.2d 648, 651-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)) (noting that termination may be inappropriate, under the State's statute for termination based on abandonment, for a
father serving a life sentence for killing the child's mother when the father made
consistent efforts to contact and to support the child).
102 See, e.g., In re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 143-44, 631 A.2d
928, 936 (1993). NewJersey courts are required to consider several factors prior to terminating parental
rights of incarcerated parents. See id. These factors include: the parent-child relationship before and after incarceration; the potential for communication, support,
and visitation after incarceration; the potential harm to the child if the relationship
is continued; and the effect that continuing the relationship would have on the psychological and emotional well-being of the child. See id.
103 See, e.g., id. The NewJersey Supreme Court addressed the
importance of the
parent-child relationship, the constitutional protection afforded this relationship,
and the care that must be taken in making the decision to terminate parental
rights. See id. at 132-37, 631 A.2d at 930-31. Later, the court discussed the potentially varied impact of a parent's incarceration and the termination of parental
rights on a child and the resultant need to make individualized determinations before terminating an incarcerated parent's custody rights. See id. at 138-44, 631 A.2d
at 933-36.
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States that Terminate Based on Durationof Incarceration

Some states will terminate incarcerated parents' rights merely
because they will be in prison for a given period of time. 0 4 Generally, these states have statutes that allow for termination based on unfitness, abandonment, or neglect.' 5 These states rely on the argument that criminals intend the consequences of their actions,
including the resulting imprisonment.'0 6 Thus, the argument proceeds, by committing a crime, the parent intended to go to prison
and to abandon or neglect his or her child. 0 7 Accordingly, it is appropriate to terminate the incarcerated person's parental rights.' 8 It
can also be argued that incarceration indicates unfitness, which
permits the state to terminate parental rights.'09 Proceedings in
these states do not necessarily consider the effects of a parent's in-

carceration on the child or on the relationship shared by the parent
and child."0 These states ignore the fundamental nature of the parent-child relationship by terminating this important relationship
based wholly on one's status as incarcerated without any type of

meaningful investigation."' While Stanley requires states to give the
parent a hearing, the parent does not receive the meaningful analysis envisioned by Stanley because termination is permitted based on

104

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997)

(mandating the period of time as six years from date of adjudication of dependency
or neglect); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the
length of time as more than five years if the child is in state care).
, See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604; IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116.
106 See Philip J.Prygoski, When A HearingIs Not A Hearing:
IrrebuttablePresumptions
and Termination of Parental Rights Based on Status, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 879, 888-92
(1983) (analyzing several cases that stand for the proposition that an offender intends the consequences of his actions, including incarceration and the attendant
determination of parental unfitness and subsequent loss of parental rights).
107See In re L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 137, 631 A.2d at 933. The New Jersey Supreme
Court noted:
The trial court here concluded that H.E. should be deemed to have
intended the consequences of his criminal acts. The result of H.E.'s
conviction has been his extended incarceration, which has rendered
him unable to render any of the 'regular and expected functions of
care and support of [his] child as required' by statute N.J.S.A. 9:3-46a.
Id.
100 See Prygoski, supranote 106, at 888-92.
109 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997).
110 See, e.g., id.

Ill See Genty, supra note 21, at 766-73.

The author argues that termination procedures of this type are constitutionally inadequate and draw impermissible presumptions. See id. Genty explains that "strict, formal hearing procedures must be
followed" to satisfy the Due Process Clause. See id. at 771.
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incarceration status without consideration of other factors.1 1 2 Further, these states ignore the available psychological data, which indicate both that incarcerated parents and children can have healthy,
positive relationships and that permanent separation can have damaging effects."' To provide the constitutional protection owed the
parent-child relationship and to protect the interests of both parent
and child, these states must enact legislation implementing more effective4 and progressive termination procedures for incarcerated par11
ents.

States that permit termination of parental rights based on incarceration fall into several groups. Iowa and Colorado are typical of
states with statutes that permit termination based solely on incarceration for a specified period of time."5 Parents whose children are in
state care pursuant to an adjudication of dependency or neglect may
lose their parental rights if the parents are to be incarcerated for a
certain amount of time from the date the child was deemed dependent or neglected."' In Oregon, a parent may lose his or her rights by
way of adoption if the child is not in foster care and the parent has
been incarcerated for three years." 7 Other states' statutes mention
incarceration as a basis to terminate, but do not specify a period of
time that will allow for termination."" A harsher alternative exists in
some states. 11 Maryland, for example, does not explicitly list incarceration as a basis for termination in its statute. 20 Despite this omission, any parent whose child remains in foster care for more than
one year is at risk of losing his or her child. 2 1 In a state such as this,
11

See supranotes 41-53 and accompanying text.

n: See supranotes 77-83 and accompanying text.
14 See Genty, supra note 21, at 771, 822-23. The author contends that termination based solely on incarceration ignores the importance of the parent-child relationship, the constitutional protection afforded the relationship, and the data that
suggest incarcerated parents and their children can share positive relationships. See

id.

115 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 1990 & Supp.
1997); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.116 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
16 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604;
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116.
117 See OR. REv. STAT. § 109.322
(1997).
118 See Aviz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) (permitting ter-

mination where the parent will be imprisoned for "such length that the child will be
deprived of a normal home for a period of years"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (1996)
(allowing termination when there will be "imprisonment, of such duration as to
render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of
time").
119 See, e.g.,
150 See id.
121

See id.

MD. CODE ANN.,

FAM. LAW

§ 5-313 (1991 & Supp. 1997).
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an incarcerated parent who cannot make private arrangements for
his or her child's care and must rely on the state's foster care netyear.22
work can potentially lose the child in as little as one
The danger of statutes that consider only the length of incarceration as a basis for termination is clearly demonstrated in an Arizona Appellate Court decision. In rejuvenile Action No. JS-5609 2' - involved a father's appeal of the order terminating his parental
rights. 24 The father was serving a nine-year jail term with five years
remaining at the time of the termination proceedings. 2 5 Prior to incarceration, the father had close contact with his child despite his divorce from the child's natural mother. 26 After his incarceration, he
attempted to remain in contact with his child, but the natural
mother thwarted these attempts.ln While in prison, the father effectively dealt with his drug and alcohol problems and worked to rehabilitate himself. 28 Additionally, he took college courses, and his record contained letters supporting his character and strong work
ethic.'2 9
Based on this evidence, it appears as if the father had the ability
to be a positive influence in his child's life. Irrespective of this evidence of parental "fitness," the court chose to terminate his parental
rights based on the length of his sentence.' 30 Although the child
lived at home with the mother, the court determined that failing to
terminate the father's rights would rob the child of a normal home
life.' The court did not consider the positive role the father could
have played in his child's life or the potentially damaging effects of
termination of parental rights. After a full analysis, termination may
indeed have been the appropriate remedy, but the risk of error in
making this determination without a full analysis is too great 2consid1'
ering the different relationship each parent and child share.
1- See, e.g., In re Nadene, 701 A.2d 1021 (R.I. 1997) (terminating parental rights

under this type of statute where mother was incarcerated and child was in State care
for more than 12 months).
...720 P.2d 548 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
24

125

126

See id. at 549.

See id.
See id.

127 See id.
128

See id.

1

See Juvenile Action No. JS-5609, 720 P.2d at 549.

130 See

id. at 55 1.
550-51.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972) (emphasizing the need for

131 See id.at
132

individualized determinations before terminating such an important right); On
Prisonersand Parenting,supra note 25, at 1411-18 (describing the varied effects of pa-
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The varied effects of incarceration mandate an individualized
approach to termination.' Looking at incarceration in a vacuum is
ineffective.'M The risk is too great that a potentially positive relationship will be terminated and the negative effects of incarceration will
be heightened by permanent separation. ' Further, any approach
that terminates such an important relationship without a meaningful
investigation does not respect the fundamental nature of the parentchild relationship.16 Technically, parents are afforded the individual
hearing required by Stanley, but termination follows based solely on
incarceration status if the court fails to consider other factors. Lesser
approaches shun the constitutional dimension of the parent-child
relationship and completely ignore the varied effects that parental
incarceration has on children.
B.

States that Terminate Based on the Nature of the Crime

Several states consider the nature of the crime and the surrounding circumstances as factors that could suggest unfitness and
warrant termination of parental rights.' This approach appears better than others that look solely at incarceration status. It assesses the
person individually and his specific acts - an approach that at least
rental incarceration on children).
13 See In re C.A.W., 683 A.2d 911, 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) ("Before
granting a
petition to terminate parental rights, it is imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible dimension of the needs and welfare of a child - the love, comfort, security, and closeness - entailed in a parent-child relationship, as well as the
tanible dimension.").
I See Genty, supra note 21, at 771 (emphasizing the importance of meaningful,
individualized determinations prior to terminating parental fights).
155 See C.A.W,
683 A.2d at 917-18 (discussing the serious ramifications of termination of parental rights and the attendant need to look at the child, his bond to
the parent, and the potential effects of termination prior to ordering termination,
in order to prevent the erroneous destruction of a positive and beneficial parentchild relationship).
136
See supra Part I-A and accompanying notes.
137 See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 1989 & Supp.
1997) (stating in
general terms that termination is permitted if the parent is convicted of a felony
where the felony "is of such nature as to prove the unfitness of such parent to have
future custody and control of the child"); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-3-4 (West Supp.
1997) (permitting termination based on certain crimes including murder, involuntary manslaughter, and rape as indicia of parental unfitness); MoNT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-3-609 (1997) (allowing termination of parental rights if the parent is convicted
of a felony in which sexual intercourse occurred and, as a result of the intercourse,
the child is born); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 128.106 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997)
(permitting termination for a "conviction of the parent for commission of a felony,
if the facts of the crime are of such a nature as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to provide adequate care and control to the extent necessary for the child's
physical, mental or emotional health and development").
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nominally considers the constitutional nature of the parent-child relationship as well as the available psychological information. The
shortcomings of this approach, however, are similar to termination
based solely on incarceration. One potential problem exists because
a healthy and positive relationship may be terminated based on the
nature of the crime the incarcerated parent committed, which does
not necessarily indicate his or her parenting abilities.'9 8 Parents have
lost their children based on convictions for arson" and murder.'4
The argument that the parent committed the crime and intended its
consequences, including a finding of unfitness and abandonment, is
too tenuous. A parent who committed arson or even murder may
not necessarily be an unfit parent who deserves to lose his or her
child.'14 Several courts have seized on this reasoning and require the
state to demonstrate a link between the crime and parental unfitness
prior to termination of parental rights.4 2 One court refused to terminate parental rights when the father killed the mother and noted
that it may have been a crime of passion, "not the product of a violent and vicious character."14 ' Thus, the court did not view the crime
as indicative of the offender's parenting abilities and, accordingly,
did not terminate parental rights.'" Other courts have held that this
scenario has such a devastating impact on the child and shows such
disregard for the child that termination is appropriate. 5 But crimes
alone do not necessarily negate the positive relationship that a par13
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-3-4. The Indiana involuntary termination
statute permits termination based on the commission of certain crimes including
involuntary manslaughter. See id. Accidentally killing someone while driving an
automobile can potentially result in a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. See
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-4 (West 1998). Arguably, accidentally killing someone
while driving is not indicative of an individual's parenting skills or fitness to main-

tain custody of a child.

See In reStrickler, 514 A.2d 140, 141-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
See In re A.R.M., 750 S.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
141 See In re H.L.T., 298 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (finding
that a father convicted of manslaughter did not deserve to lose parental rights where he was
devoted, maintained contact with his child while in prison, was eligible for parole,
and142had ajob waiting for him upon release).
See In re B.C., 356 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that termination was appropriate not solely because the mother murdered one of her children, but because her psychological condition that led to the crime made her unfit
to retain parental rights over the other child); In re D.S.C., 155 Cal. Rptr. 406, 41314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding lower court's termination of parental rights and
noting that the lower court properly evaluated the link between the crime and the
offender's fitness as a parent).
:43 InreJames M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 222, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
44 See id. at 265-66.
145 See In reAdoption of Doe, 657 P.2d 134, 138 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1982).
139
140
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ent and child may share - a relationship that may continue to thrive
while the parent is in prison."'
The argument for termination of parental rights based on the
nature of the crime and surrounding facts becomes more compelling when the child is the victim of the parent's crime.' 47 The desire
to save time and energy appears reasonable in these scenarios. To
respect the constitutional protection afforded the parent-child relationship, however, a full hearing is necessary. Several states do conduct such an analysis prior to termination of parental rights, even
though termination is most likely the appropriate result in such circumstances.'" Again, these parents may deserve to lose their children, but this determination cannot be made without exploring the
specific parent-child relationship and the effect of parental incarceration on that relationship. Looking solely at incarceration status
and the nature of the crime simply cannot determine the appropriateness of termination and does not respect the fundamental nature
of the parent-child relationship or the available psychological information.
C. States that Terminate Based on IncarcerationStatus
Other states considering whether to terminate an incarcerated
individual's parental rights look at incarceration status plus either
the parent's ability to provide a normal home for the child, or basic
efforts made by the parent to support and contact the child during
the parent's incarceration. 4 9 This approach improves on those de-

,46 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
47 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997)
(permitting
termination based on certain crimes against children such as sexual abuse); see also
In reJ.M., 702 So. 2d 45, 49-50 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (permitting termination when
mother was serving a 21-year sentence for killing her other child).
148 See In re Baby Girl Suchy, 281 N.W.2d 723, 724 (Minn. 1979)
(terminating parental fights when a mother was convicted of attempted murder of her child, but
the decision was based on her mental incapacity and unfitness to care for the child,
not on her incarceration status); In re Sego, 513 P.2d 831, 832-34 (Wash. 1973)
(terminating parental rights of a father convicted of murdering the child's mother
not based on the crime itself, but rather on a determination of parental unfitness
after exploring the parent-child relationship as a whole).
149 See, e.g., MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(h) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998)
(permitting termination based on incarceration for two years and inability to provide a normal home in the foreseeable future); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447 (West
1996 & Supp. 1998) (permitting termination based on "conviction of the parent of
a felony offense that the court finds is of such a nature that the child will be deprived of a stable home for a period of years; provided, however, that incarceration
in and of itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights"); see also
Bergmann v. McCullough, 461 S.E.2d 544, 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that in-

1998]

PRISONERS' PARENTAL RIGHTS

333

lineated above in that it involves individualized determinations of
parental fitness in compliance with the Due Process Clause."" However, this approach also can be problematic and ineffective. One
court held that a father's unwillingness to share his $1.50 per day
prison salary indicated his unwillingness to provide for his children
and allowed for termination of parental rights on that basis.'-" Sharing this salary, which he may have needed to survive in prison, did
not necessarily indicate his parenting abilities or the possibility of a
positive parent-child relationship. Thus, focusing solely on contacts
and support may be an ineffective manner in which to assess the parental rights of an incarcerated parent and may result in inappropriate severance of the parent-child relationship.
Another problem is that a child may be left in a harmful relationship with a parent who makes the minimum contacts or provides
the minimum support that the statute requires. E.WPR v. W.T.J.52
involved a father's appeal of the termination of his parental rights.5 3
The father was serving a sentence for three sexual battery convictions
and was ineligible for parole until the child was seventeen.'5 4 The
court also received information that the father could be a danger to
the child.'
Focusing solely on contacts and support while the father
was in prison, the court decided not to terminate the father's rights
since the statutory criteria for abandonment had not been met.' 6 It
is ironic to note that the father actually failed to contact or support
his child during his incarceration, but the court excused him from
these obligations because the incarceration itself, and the natural
mother's refusal to cooperate, made maintenance of a parent-child
relationship impossible. 5 7 As this case demonstrates, looking solely
carceration plus a failure to contact and support the child for one year justified
termination); In re Caldwell, 571 N.W.2d 218, 218-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(analyzing termination for incarcerated parent looking at the parent's efforts to
contact and support the child).
150 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
656-58 (1972).
151
See In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 483-85 (Colo. 1985).
15 702 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
153
154
155

See id.
See id. at 1344.
See id. at 1345.

See id.
See id. The trial court itself expressed displeasure with this result, but nonetheless was bound by the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in In re B.W., 498 So. 2d
946 (Fla. 1986). See E.WR, 702 So. 2d at 1345. The court opined:
[W]e are prompted to ask whether blood is thicker than common
sense and the best interests of the child. In the instant situation, the
child had no contact prior to appellant's incarceration, and she will
have no meaningful contact until at least the age of 17 when appellant
'5

157
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to support and contact can be ineffective because it overlooks the
potential harmful impact of a continued relationship and ignores
the best interests of the child.
Another problem of this approach is that a prison sentence of a
certain length will be interpreted to mean that the parent cannot
provide a normal home, thereby allowing for termination of parental
rights.'68 A presumption based on the length of incarceration negates the individualized, meaningful hearing anticipated by Stanley.5 9
This approach is problematic. Considering only the ability to
provide a home or valuing minimum contacts ignores the psychological data and the possible effects of parental incarceration on a
child. The positive emotional qualities of the parent-child relationship and the nurturing aspect can survive a parent's imprisonment
even though the parent presently cannot provide a suitable home or
financial security for the child. This approach also ignores the constitutional protection afforded the parent-child relationship by allowing termination based on a less-than-full-scale analysis. Again, a
strong parent-child relationship may not exist, and the need for
permanency in a child's life may warrant termination of the incarcerated parent's rights. This determination cannot be made, however, without an in-depth, individualized investigation.
D. States that Analyze all Facets of the Parent-ChildRelationship
Some states do engage in a meaningful analysis of the parentchild relationship prior to termination of parental rights for incarcerated parents." These states consider the varied psychological efmay be released. The child does, however, have a stepfather willing to
adopt her.
Id.

15 See Neal v.Johnson, 414 N.W.2d 916, 919 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). The State's
statute permitted termination if the parent would be unable to establish a home
within 12 months. See id. When the parent was serving an extended sentence and
there was no evidence he would be out on parole in 12 months, termination was
appropriate. See id.
59 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57
(1972).
160 See, e.g., Genty, supra note 21, at 831-35. California has
a comprehensive system for termination proceedings for incarcerated parents. See id. at 831. The parent has the right to be present at the hearing and to be represented by counsel. See
id. The court must initially determine if reunification is in the child's best interests.
See id. The court should consider several factors to make this determination, including: the age of the child, the degree of parent-child bonding, the length of the
sentence, the nature of treatment, the nature of the crime, the degree of detriment
to the child if the relationship is continued, the child's attitude toward reunification, and other appropriate factors. See id. If continuation of the relationship is in
the best interest of the child, the state must make efforts to facilitate the relation-
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fects of incarceration and understand the need for an approach that
focuses on the child's best interests and makes individualized determinations prior to terminating a parent's rights.16 ' These states also
acknowledge the fundamental nature of the parent-child relationship and the unfairness of terminating this important relationship
based on anything less than a full-scale, individualized determination. 16 Specifically, these states look beyond incarceration, the nature of the crime, or minimum contacts when making a determination of parental fitness.' 3 They analyze the parent-child relationship
before and after incarceration, the effect of parental incarceration
on the child, the possibility of having a beneficial relationship during the parent's incarceration, and the parent's ability to fulfill his or
her obligations.1 4 The ideal approach is a full-scale analysis that determines if there is a statutory basis to allow termination while primarily considering the best interests of the child.6 5 In the end, termination may be the appropriate step, but a well-thought-out
decision fulfills the mandates of66 both the Due Process Clause and
the available psychological data.

New Jersey's approach to termination of parental rights for incarcerated parents is one of the most comprehensive and empathetic
approaches to the constitutional requirements and the unique problems raised in a termination proceeding. The New Jersey Supreme
Court demonstrated this approach best in In re Adoption of Children by
L.A.S.1'6

This case involved the attempt of L.A.S. to adopt his wife's

children because the children's natural father was in prison for
murder and was ineligible for parole for thirty years.'16 Adoption
shik and termination is, accordingly, inappropriate. See id.
See In re Carmen G., 1998 WT 46228 at *3-4 (Conn. Super. Ct.,Jan. 26, 1998);
In re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139-44, 631 A.2d 928, 933-36 (1993).
162
See L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 143, 631 A.2d at 936 ("Because the parental interest itself is so fundamental, that determination cannot be made without a full and conscientious consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances.").
163 See Carmen G., 1998 WL 46228 at
*3-4. Connecticut also engages in a meaningul analysis prior to termination for incarcerated parents. See id.
See id. Factors considered by the Connecticut courts include: the age of the
child and the need for permanency, the child's emotional attachment to the parent,
the effect of termination on the child, the effect of a continued relationship on the
child, and the parent's ability to provide for the child and to be a positive influence
in the child's life. See id.
165 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977)
(StewartJ, concurring) (holding that termination based solely on the best interests
of the child would violate the Due Process Clause and that there must also be some
statutory basis tojustify termination).
See supra Parts I-A & I-B and accompanying notes.
167
134 N.J. 127, 631 A.2d 928 (1993).
M See id. at 129, 631 A.2d at 929.
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would require terminating the natural father's parental rights.6 9
H.E., the natural father, opposed the adoption."O The trial court
held that H.E.'s lengthy incarceration rendered him unable to perform his duties as a parent, which the court equated to abandonment of his children, a basis for termination in New Jersey.'' The
court ruled that termination, therefore, should follow.

72

The trial

court noted that committing a crime is "equivalent to intending the
consequences of that crime, including imprisonment."7 - The trial
court's reasoning surmised that the father intended to be impris-4
oned for a lengthy period by virtue of the crime he committed.1
The natural result of his crime, the opinion reasoned, rendered him
unable to care for his children. 75 The trial court found that the father essentially abandoned his children
and that termination of his
76
parental rights was appropriate.

The appellate division reversed the trial court's ruling in
L.A.S.177 and held that termination based solely on incarceration is

unacceptable.' 78 The appellate court further held that termination
should occur only after "the trial court has engaged in a 'multi-facet
[sic] evaluation of abandonment
in which incarceration is but one of
7 9
the factors considered. "

The NewJersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate division's
ruling in an insightful opinion that laid down comprehensive guidelines for courts considering termination of parental rights for incarcerated parents. 80 The court began by reiterating the fundamental
nature of the parent-child relationship, the constitutional protection
afforded to this relationship, and the severity of termination of parental rights.'81 The court noted that, in order to comply with the
United States Supreme Court's criteria set out in Stanley and Santosky,
lower courts must find clear and convincing evidence of the statutory
169

See NJ.

STAT. ANN.

§ 9:3-50 (West 1993). Adoption terminates the rights and

obligations between the child and natural parent. See id.
17
171

See L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 129, 631 A.2d at 929.
See id at 131-32, 631 A.2d at 930.

172See

id.
1'3
See id.at 132, 631 A.2d at 930.
174 See id. at 131-32, 631
A.2d at 930.
175 See

id.
See L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 131-32, 631 A.2d at 930.
177 See id. at 132, 631 A.2d
at 930.
176

178

See id.

179Id. (quoting

In re L.A.S., 258 NJ. Super. 614, 621, 610 A.2d 925, 929 (App.

Div. 1992)).
18OSee id.
at 143-44, 631 A.2d at 936.
181 See id. at 132-33, 631 A.2d at 930-31.
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criteria at a full hearing before permitting termination of parental
rights.'2 Further, the court noted the varied effects of parental incarceration on children and indicated that individualized determinations of parental fitness are required.'
The court then announced the approach New Jersey courts
should employ when considering termination of parental rights for
incarcerated parents.14 The court explained that under the relevant
New Jersey statutes at the time, termination of parental rights was
permitted in cases of abandonment; substantial neglect of parental
duties; failure to perform normal parental functions including care,
support, and maintenance of an emotional relationship; or when a
child is in the care of the Division of Youth and Family Services or a
state-approved agency, and the parent fails to rectify the problem
that led to the placement for at least one year.18"
The New Jersey court held that incarceration alone cannot be
the basis to demonstrate any of these grounds for termination of parental rights. 1 6 Rather, in deciding whether or not to terminate a
prisoner's parental rights, the supreme court stated that New Jersey
courts must look to several factors. 87 First, the court began, courts
must consider the nature of the parent-child relationship prior to incarceration, whether the parent performed his or her duties, and the
ability of the children to rely on the parent.'88 Second, the court posited, courts must also consider the parent-child relationship after the
parent's incarceration, including communication and visitation."'
The court further maintained that a prisoner's ability to continue
contacting, visiting, and emotionally supporting and guiding his or
her children in the future are also important considerations. ' "
Moreover, the court determined, New Jersey courts should focus on
the parent's criminal disposition and the potential effects of that
disposition on the children, as well as the parent's attempts at rehabilitation while in prison.' 9 ' Finally, the court directed, courts should
use an expert to determine "the need of the children for permanency and stability and whether continuation of the parent-child re18 See L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 132-33, 631 A.2d at 930-31.

183 See id. at
184 See id. at
185 See id. at
186 See id. at
187

138-43, 631 A.2d at 933-36.
143-44, 631 A.2d at 936.
133-34, 631 A.2d at 931.
143-44, 631 A.2d at 936.

See id.

See L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 143, 631 A.2d at 936.
19 See id.
188

190

See id.

191

See id.at 143-44, 631 A.2d at 936.
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lationship... will undermine that need."9 2 The court concluded
that lower courts also should look to "the effect that the continuation of the parent-child relationship will have on the psychological
and emotional well-being of the children."' 3
The New Jersey approach is valuable because it ascertains
whether there is a basis for termination while keeping the best interests of the child in the forefront. This approach recognizes the importance of the parent-child relationship and the complex issues
raised by termination of an incarcerated person's parental rights.'9
This in-depth, individualized approach respects the fundamental interest parents have in their children and recognizes the gravity and
finality of parental rights termination.' 95
When a parent stands to lose his or her child, a fundamental
right is at stake. In such instances, a less-than-thorough approach is
simply unacceptable to safeguard these interests. New Jersey's approach respects the spirit of Stanley, due process concerns, and the
constitutional protection given to the parent-child relationship because it requires an individualized determination before an important right is extinguished. The New Jersey method also recognizes
the uniqueness of every parent-child relationship and the fact that
incarceration will have a different psychological effect on every child.
New York also employs a unique approach to proceedings for
termination of a prisoner's parental rights. Prior to 1983, New York
law permitted termination based solely on incarceration status. '
This rule has subsequently changed. 97 Under current New York law,
abandonment is still a basis to terminate the rights of any parent."'
Incarceration alone, however, does not prove abandonment and
does not, therefore, allow for termination. ' " Detailed analysis must
192

Id. at 144, 631 A.2d at 936.

195

Id.

194 See

L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 138-41, 631 A.2d at 933-35.
See id. at 143-44, 631 A.2d at 936.
19
SeeJoseph R. Carrieri, The Rights of IncarceratedParents,N.Y. L.J.,Jan. 12, 1990,
at 1. The author discusses New York's involuntary termination statute. See id. Prior
to 1983 an incarcerated parent's consent was not required for adoption, which essentially terminated a prisoner's parental rights based on incarceration status. See
id. This rule was held not to violate due process because the State considered inmates incapable of caring for their children, thus justifying termination. See id. at
1,4 (citing In reEricJ.B., 460 N.Y.S.2d 133, 133-34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)).
1 See id. at 1, 4 (discussing Chapter 911 of the Laws of 1983, which overruled
Domestic Relations Law Section III (2) (d) - a law that allowed termination for parents serving an indeterminate sentence with a maximum of life imprisonment).
195

198See id. at 4.
199

See id.
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be performed and procedures must be followed prior to termination. 00 Initially, a court must determine the likely impact of visitation on the parent-child relationship. 2W' There are several factors to
consider in making this determination, including: the parent's desire or capacity to maintain the parent-child relationship, the permanency planning goal already in place or the potential to develop
one, the length of time the parent is to be incarcerated, the parentchild relationship prior to the parent's incarceration, the child's age
and desire to visit, the nature of the parent's crime, and the circumstances surrounding the crime.02
If continued contact serves the child's best interests, then the
parent and state agency must devise a plan that provides for the
child's needs and helps the parent with his or her problems. 205 The
state must then make diligent efforts to carry out the plan and 20to4
help the parent and child develop a meaningful relationship.
Such efforts focus on facilitating visitation and providing rehabilitative services to help the parent with any problems. 205 If visitation is in
the child's best interest and an effective plan can be implemented,
then an incarcerated parent's rights should only be terminated if he
or she, on more than one occasion while incarcerated, fails to cooperate with the agency in planning the child's future or arranging visitation. 206
E. A Suggested Approach
Looking at these varying state approaches, the constitutional
protection afforded the parent-child relationship, and the available
psychological data, an ideal approach to termination of parental
rights for incarcerated parents begins to emerge. The parent-child
relationship is fundamental. It is simply unsatisfactory to terminate
such an important relationship without a meaningful hearing in
which an individualized determination is made that considers several
factors in addition to the fact of incarceration itself. Further, the
psychological data indicate that incarceration of a parent affects

200

201
202
20S

204
205
206

See id.
See id.
See Carrieri, supra note 196, at 4.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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children differently, which also speaks to the need for individualized
determinations. °7
An ideal approach to parental rights termination proceedings
would be one that provides a full hearing at which the parent is present and represented by counsel. The court should look at several
criteria to determine if a statutory basis exists to terminate parental
rights as well as what is in the best interests of the child. These criteria should include: the nature of the parent-child relationship before and during the parent's incarceration; the parent's ability to
maintain a relationship with the child and to fulfill his parental duties, focusing especially on the length of the incarceration; the psychological effects of incarceration and visitation in prison on the
child; and the child's age and need for stability and permanency. 208
Only after considering these factors can an accurate decision be
made as to whether termination of parental rights is warranted. This
procedure could be expensive and time consuming,2 but terminating a fundamental relationship with a lesser procedure is constitutionally unacceptable and fails to acknowledge the varied effects of
parental incarceration on children. 21 0 Because of the constitutional
protection owed to parent-child relationships, the sanctity of those
relationships, and the varied impact of parental incarceration and
termination of parental rights, states should enact legislation that
implements thorough procedures assuring a full and fair hearing of
all relevant facts and circumstances before parental rights are terminated.
CONCLUSION
Termination of parental rights has serious ramifications in that
it permanently severs the parent-child relationship.2 1' Termination is
especially difficult for incarcerated parents. 21 2 Parental incarceration
and termination of parental rights psychologically affect children dif207

See supra Part I-B and accompanying notes.

208

See In re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 143-44, 631 A.2d 928, 936 (indicating the need

to consider these factors in termination proceedings for incarcerated parents after
discussing the due process and psychological issues raised by termination for incarcerated parents); On Prisoners and Parenting,supra note 25, at 1411-17 (mentioning
length of incarceration, age of the child, and nature of the parent-child relationship
as important factors in assessing the impact of parental incarceration on a child).
209 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
656 (1972).
2:0 See supra Parts I-A & I-B and accompanying
notes.
211 See, e.g., IND. CODEANN. § 31-35-6-4 (West Supp. 1997).
212 See In re Caldwell, 571 N.W.2d 218, 218-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (pointing to
the difficulties in applying traditional termination criteria to incarcerated parents).
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ferently and thus should be important considerations in any termination proceeding."' It is necessary to avoid exacerbating the effects
of incarceration by permanently ending the parent-child relationship, but it is also important not to leave a child in a harmful relationship. Another essential consideration is the constitutional protection afforded the parent-child relationship, which is implicated by
any attempt to terminate. 4 Terminating such a fundamental relaThe
tionship is a dire step and deserves careful consideration. 2 1
constitutional protection afforded the parent-child relationship and
the varied psychological effects of parental incarceration on the
child indicate the need for individualized determinations and close
scrutiny before the parent-child relationship is severed.
States vary in their approaches to termination of parental rights
for incarcerated parents. While the desire to conserve time and resources is valid, states that look to the fact of incarceration alone, the
nature of the crime, the parent's ability to provide for the child, or
efforts to maintain minimum contacts overlook the psychological
data and the due process concerns involved in termination. States
should engage in an in-depth, individualized analysis prior to terminating an incarcerated parent's rights. Such an analysis is the only
way to respect the psychological and constitutional concerns raised
by termination of parental rights for incarcerated parents and to
avoid errors that could be extremely harmful to the parent and
child.
Steven Fleischer

213

See On Prisoners and Parenting, supra note 25, at 1411-17 (acknowledging the

varied effects of parental incarceration on children).
214 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-52 (addressing the constitutional concerns raised
by termination).
215
See id. at 657 (noting that administrative convenience does not excuse the
failure to hold a meaningful hearing).

